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I. INTRODUCTION

The scholarship on conventional disarmament, especially vis-A-vis the
trade in conventional weapons, is surprisingly scarce. Whether the vacuum in
the literature results from a focus on nuclear proliferation (or for that matter, on
weapons of mass destruction), or alternatively, whether scholars chose to
emphasize the problem of small arms and light weapons, the reality remains:
on the eve of the official negotiations on an arms trade treaty, it is disappointing
to see how little attention academic circles have paid to the topic. In this paper,
I rely on the international relations literature on legalization and regime design
to analyze the international trade on conventional weapons as an issue area, and
the regulatory environment within which the relevant actors interact.
As we approach the moment to launch the official negotiation of an arms
trade treaty, it is important to refine our understanding of the regime that has
been in place since 1992, in light of lessons learned from other negotiations.
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Without denying the role of prior arms control efforts, this paper focuses on the
process that initiated with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/36
[L] of 9 December 1991.1 This document establishes a non-legally binding
obligation whereby states agree to report on their international trade in
conventional weapons to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms.
The paper is organized as follows: section two reviews assessments of the
current regime; section three discusses several academic literatures that can
shed light on treaty negotiation, in particular, international law and international
relations; section four studies the empirical legacy of the UN Register in light
of this literature; section five concentrates on the prospects of an arms trade
treaty; and section six offers concluding remarks.

II.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGISTER

The UN Register began to operate in 1992, the first year for which official
information on arms transfers is available.3 As of 2006, 172 states have
submitted information at least once. 4 The UN Register covers seven categories
of weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles (as well as
missile-launchers). 5 The launching of the UN Register met with a great deal of
expectation within various policy circles. As time went on, some of the initial
optimism had waned. In one of the first assessments of the institution, Siemon
T. Wezeman supports an overhaul of the UN Register.6 For him, the institution
so far has succeeded in establishing a global norm for transparency in arms
transfers, but failed in its more ambitious objectives:

1.
G.A. Res. 46/36[L], U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991). Richard Betts refers to the
Brussels Act of 1890 as the first multilateral effort to regulate the international trade in conventional arms.
Richard K. Betts, The Tragicomedy ofArms Trade Control, 5 INT'L SEC. 80, 83 (Summer 1980). In 1919,
twenty-three states negotiated the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which
never entered in effect. Conventionfor the Controlof the Trade in Arms andAmmunition, 15 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 297, 297 (1921) (not entered into force) [hereinafter Convention]. More recently, states negotiated the
non-binding 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement. See generally Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, July 11, 1996, http://www.wassenaar.org/
docs/LE96.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
2.

G.A. Res. 46/36[L), U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991).

3.

U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS [UNODA], UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS: PATTERN OF REPORTING BY STATES 1992-2006 2, available at
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register-files/Registerdatabookletl992-2005.doc (last visited Mar. 22,2008).
4.

Id.

5.

Id.at5.

6.
Siemon T. Wezeman, The Future ofthe United Nations Register of ConventionalArms, SIPRI,
at 24, August 2003, http://bokssipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP04.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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[T]he UN Register has performed worse than the great majority of...
other initiatives both in terms of reaching its targets, and of capacity
for self-reform and adaptation. After its initial success in securing
near universal acceptance of the principle of transparency in armaments, it failed to secure comprehensive participation and consistent
observance; to harvest genuinely useful data; to analyse it; or to
achieve practical follow-up in terms of identifying and correcting
potentially destabilizing build-ups of arms.'
Stephanie G. Neuman offers a more balanced view of the arms control
initiative Writing in the aftermath of the 1991 United Nations Conference on
the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the
coming into force of the UN Register in 1992, she analyses the historical
circumstances that favorably impact the notion of arms control.9 Among those,
the end of the Cold War features quite prominently, especially if we consider
government-to-government arms transfers.'° In her view, the economic context
and the move toward democratization in various countries constitute another set
of positive forces:
In sum, we are witnessing a structural form of conventional arms
control caused by economic factors that makes arms-control initiatives potentially more attractive to recipients and suppliers. In
response to the deflating arms trade, some supplier states have found
it possible to initiate more restrictive arms export policies without
paying a political price domestically. Many governments find themselves freer to respond to advocates for arms control in a situation in
which military industries, weakened by falling orders and their own
declining numbers, are able to fight less fiercely for permissive export
legislation."
Nevertheless, the picture is not entirely optimistic. Neuman points to
technological advances and to the increased mobility of former scientists and
arms experts as a cause for concern.' 2 In addition, the rise in the illicit trade

7.

Id. at3.

8.

Stephanie G. Neuman, Controllingthe Arms Trade:IdealisticDream orRealpolitik?, 16(No.

3) WASH. Q. 53 (1993), reprinted in WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S 327-42 (Brad Roberts ed.,

1989).
9.

See id.

10.

Stephanie G. Neuman, The Arms Trade, MilitaryAssistance, and Recent Wars: Change and

Continuity, 541 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 47, 54 (1995).
11.

Neuman, supra note 8, at 335.

12.

Neuman, supra note 8, at 339.
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and the challenges that effective monitoring presents 3 contribute to a skeptical
view of the prospects for the commitments embedded in the UN Register. In
retrospect, Neuman's preoccupation was not unfounded. The 2003 assessment
sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
rebuts the favorable economic context thesis and offers a rather pessimistic
view of the future for market constraints on the arms trade.' 4
In contrast to Wezeman's view, most recently, the Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) expresses a rather positive attitude in relation to the UN
Register and the prospects for further developments. 5
The overall optimistic tone of the 2003 Report is balanced by concerns
with inconsistency on reporting by states, which the Report suggests may be
attributed to international security problems. 6 There is an emphasis on the goal
7
of universal membership, which reinforces the role of "nil" reports.'
Confidence building and transparency depend on universality and the practice
of submitting "nil" reports contribute to both. 8 The report acknowledges the
GGE discussion of the small arms and light weapons issue." To that end,
revising category 11120 of weapons currently covered by Resolution 46/36 [L]
could be an effective mechanism to extend the reach of the UN Register over
some light weapons. The 2003 GGE appears to struggle with divergent
positions on the expansion proposal, and ultimately recommends lowering the
range threshold from 100mm to 75mm. 2' This is an important development
because it contemplates the inclusion of small arms and light weapons under the
UN Register. Concurrently, the GGE welcomes member-states' voluntary submission of data on small arms and light weapons and encourages the initiative.22
Three years later, the GGE reevaluated the performance of the UN
Register. The 2006 Report offers a positive assessment but acknowledges that
13.

Neuman, supranote 8, at 341-42.

14.

Wezeman, supra note 6, at 24.

15.
The Secretary-General, Report on the Continuing Operation of the U.N. Register of
Conventional Arms and its Further Development, 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/274
(Aug. 13, 2003) [Hereinafter 2003 Report]; The Secretary-General, Report on the Continuing Operation of
the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms and its Further Development, 2, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/61/261 (Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report].
16.

2003 Report, supra note 15, at 17.

17.

See id. at 19-20.

18.

Id. at 19.

19.

Id. at 30.

20.

Category I1nowadays comprises 75mm and above large-caliber artillery systems. Id. at 28.

21.

2003 Report, supra note 15, at 28.

22.
2003 Report, supranote 15, at 33-34. This pronouncement was key in institutionalizing formal
reporting mechanisms on small arms and light weapons under the UN Register. Nowadays, member-states
dispose of forms designed exclusively for this category, which was never a part of Resolution 46/36[L].
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the institution has not addressed states' concerns in certain parts of the world
effectively.2 3 Specifically, the scope of the UN Register continues to exclude
small arms and light weapons, except for voluntary and erratic submissions
from state members. 24 An important development in the 2006 Report dealt with
the institutionalization of an eighth category of covered weapons to encompass
small arms and light weapons, even if the obligation to report would have a
differentiated character when compared to reporting on the existing seven
categories. 25 The absence of consensus on the matter prevented uniformity in
reporting instruments for such weapons.
Given the views in the literature and the contrastingly optimistic outlook
prevalent among the Group of Governmental Experts, 26 it is important to
analyze the issue within the rigor of recent international relations scholarship.
Research on international agreements and the phenomenon of legalization in
world politics has enhanced our understanding of states behavior within an
increasingly institutionalized society of nations. International relations theory
has finally moved beyond the question of whether international institutions
matter to the pressing inquiry as to how they matter.
III. DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE OF AN ARMS CONTROL REGIME

In 2000 and 2001, two groups of scholars made a significant contribution
to our understanding of international agreements along the lines of legalization
and design, respectively. 27 In both instances, researchers analyze subjects that
have been historically within the realm of international legal scholarship
through political science lenses. Common to their initiatives is a set of
theoretical understandings and assumptions. First, institutions matter. These
two groups of scholars believe that institutions reflect states' capabilities,
thereby they are created as a means to pursue state interest. Second, in the
pursuit of their self-interest, states act as rational decision-makers. They
process information related to preferences and attempt to maximize benefits in
a strategic context. While the first group of scholars focuses on the movement
toward the legalization in international politics, the second concentrates on
certain features that are prominent within international agreements. The two

23.

2006 Report, supra note 15, at 35.

24.

Id. at 15-16.

25.

Id. at 26-27.

See generally 2003 Report, supra note 15; 2006 Report, supra note 15.
See generally Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction:Legalization and World Politics, 54 (No.
27.
3) LNT'L ORG. 385 (2000); Barbara Koremenos et al., The RationalDesign ofInternationalInstitutions, 55
(No. 4) INT'L ORG. 761 (2001); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in PostwarEurope, 54 (No. 2) INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
26.

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law

[Vol. 14:2

literatures have an important contribution for a prospective arms trade treaty
that I articulate in the next paragraphs.
Goldstein et al., introduce a journal issue dedicated to the study of
legalization as an important phenomenon in international politics.28 They
provide a definition of legalization and caution against any valuejudgment with
respect to the superiority of one form of legalization over another (for example,
is hard law better than soft law?). 29 Their goal is to better understand different
forms of legalization and, in the process, to offer guidance to individuals
negotiating or revising international regulatory arrangements. For the authors,
legalization encompasses three aspects: obligation, or the degree to which
commitments are legally binding; precision, or the degree to which the content
of commitments clearly identifies the conduct that is required, authorized, or
proscribed; and delegation, or the degree to which the interpretation, the
monitoring, and/or the implementation of commitments is transferred to a third
party.3 ° Hard law corresponds to high levels of obligation, precision, and
delegation. 3 In contrast, soft law stands for institutional arrangements where
low levels of obligation, precision, and delegation dominate.32 The
phenomenon of legalization has been a trademark of the twentieth-century, but
the expansion itself remains uneven. For example, the authors acknowledge
that "major arms control treaties are stalled by domestic political opposition."33
One goal of this research agenda is to identify the characteristics of a particular
issue area in order to devise the form of legalization that best suits the problem.
It is with this goal in mind that I proceed from here.
Abbott and Snidal propose a set of variables that are expected to influence
states' choice for soft law or hard law.34 Five among those are directly relevant
to the arms trade issue: credibility problems with respect to commitments,
transaction costs, sovereignty costs, uncertainty, and discount rates.3 5 By
reviewing the hypothesized relationships between each one of these variables
and the occurrence of hard law, this paper unveils some of the obstacles that the
pursuit of further legalization-through the negotiation of an arms trade
treaty-will encounter.
28.

Goldstein et al., supra note 27, at 387.

29.

Id. at 387-88.

30.

Id.at 387.

31.

Id.at 396.

32.

Id.at 394. The authors treat hard law and soft law as ideal types. It is common to encounter

norms that vary within a spectrum of legalization, for example an agreement that incorporates high levels of
obligation and precision, but provides for no delegation. Goldstein etal., supra note 27, at 394.
33.

Id. at 386.

34.

Kenneth W. Abbott& Duncan Snidal, HardandSoftLaw in InternationalGovernance, 54 (No.

3) INT'L ORG. 421, 423 (2000).
35.

Id.at 429.
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Credibility problems with respect to commitments arise in situations where
states negotiate agreements which have fewer chances of generating
compliance. This is often the case "when the benefits of cooperation are great
but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high. 36 Here, recourse to
hard law rewards compliance by increasing the costs associated with reneging
on commitments. An arms trade treaty is likely to embed incentives to defect
from a cooperative arrangement. States often like to have access to information
on other states' arms trade transactions better than they like to share data on
their own dealings in weapons. This preference results from the Prisoner's
Dilemma structure of incentives associated with the arms trade. The problem
is aggravated by the understanding that states will think alike and defect from
the cooperative arrangement in large numbers, ultimately compromising the
overall goal of transparency. The choice for hard law will counter the trend
toward defection, thereby enhancing the credibility of commitments. Also
adding to the advantages of hard law, in face of commitment problems, is the
fact that noncompliance may be difficult to detect. Here, the delegation aspect
of hard agreements can empower institutions to monitor behavior. An arms
trade treaty will possibly lead to more reporting (formal aspect) and less
underreporting (substantive aspect), especially if the treaty designates a
dedicated bureaucracy to oversee implementation.
Transaction costs refer to the efforts associated with the management and
implementation of international agreements. More specifically, the managerial
process encompasses the application and elaboration of the rules, while
implementation deals with monitoring, enforcement, and dispute settlement.
Abbott and Snidal suggest that agreements that take the form of hard law entail
lower transaction costs because they operate within a predictable institutional
context.3 7 For example, disputes born out of hard legal agreements are
governed by specialized procedures and are usually resolved through legal
discourse. It follows that non-legal or illegal means to settle differences, such
as reprisal and unilateral retaliation, are not tolerated. Once more, the
delegation aspect of hard legalization takes a prominent role, because short of
dispute settlement mechanisms, an arms trade treaty could very well transfer
powers to manage and to implement the agreement. Indeed, managerial
authority can even work to update the terms of the treaty in order to adapt the
language to new challenges and developments.3 8

36.

Id.

37.

Id.at 436.

A useful analogy is the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, which has interpreted
38.
the covered agreements in a somewhat extensive manner, arguably creating new law.
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Sovereignty costs, together with uncertainty and variations in states'39
discount rates make up what Abbott and Snidal refer to as contracting costs.
While hard legalization is expected to reduce post-agreement costs (or
transaction costs), soft law does arguably better at reducing contracting costsor the costs associated with the negotiation of an agreement in the first place.40
Of concern here is the characterization of the arms trade as an issue area where
high contracting costs prevail. Sovereignty costs are high because conventional
arms holdings remain an important aspect for the national security of states.
Thereby, transparency on arms trade may be perceived as jeopardizing states'
national security interests. Uncertainty is also high in this realm, mainly
because power imbalances among states are constantly shifting. For this
reason, transparency today may be acceptable, given a specific context of
relative power, but it may become cumbersome once this balance of power is
upset. Finally, states care about the future in quite distinct ways (they have
different discount rates). In particular, democracies tend to value the future
more than non-democracies; nevertheless, an effective instrument should be as
inclusive as possible. If states negotiate an arms trade treaty through hard law,
pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 61/8941 mandate, how can we
mitigate the influence of contracting costs?
Research by the second group of scholars mentioned above can shed light
on the contracting costs problem. Koremenos et al., propose that five aspects
of treaty design are prominent among the 34,000 plus international agreements
registered with the United Nations between 1946 and 1986: membership,
scope, centralization, control, and flexibility. 42 Membership indicates the total
number of states that the agreement seeks to include as participants; scope
refers to the number and breadth of issues contemplated by the agreement;
centralization stands for whether the agreement establishes an institution
charged with monitoring, interpreting, and possibly adjudicating related
matters; control refers to the decision-making rules that will govern implementation of the agreement; and flexibility deals with whether the agreement
leaves room for exceptional clauses, such as reservations, declarations, and
understandings. 43 Flexibility can also involve the use of escape clauses, withdrawal clauses and limits on agreement duration.' These five characteristics
vary from treaty to treaty, contingent upon the nature of the issue area. In this
paper I chose to focus on flexibility, leaving the analysis of the other four
39.

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 34, at 436.

40.

1d. at 434.

41.

G.A. Res. 61/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).

42.

Koremenos et al., supra note 27, at 763.

43.

Id. at 770-73.

44.

Id. at 773.
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design elements (i.e., membership, scope, centralization, and control) for a later
moment in time.
With respect to flexibility, there are four aspects of international politics
that this literature suggests will influence how flexible agreements are.45
Uncertainty and distribution problems are of special interest in the context of
an arms trade treaty,46 given the discussion above on the challenges to negotiate
hard law agreements in the presence of high contracting costs. Distribution
problems associated with an arms trade treaty may involve specification of
weapons, the level of detail required of reported weapons, and the like. The
distribution problem arises because there are multiple institutional arrangements and states have different preferences in regards to each combination.
Flexibility can enable distinct combinations to co-exist, thereby maximizing the
depth of the commitments made by states.4 7 On that note, flexibility can be said
to avoid establishing a commitment that reflects the lowest possible common
denominator.4 8
Flexibility can also mitigate contracting costs associated with uncertainty.
Here, tools such as the imposition of limits on agreement duration, escape
clauses, and withdrawal clauses may facilitate agreement where otherwise
states see little room for compromise. 49 Limits on agreement duration allow
states to revisit the terms of the agreement periodically in order to adjust for
new circumstances. The successive rounds of negotiation under the GATT/
WTO5" agreements constitute an example of flexibility through limits on
duration."' Koremenos finds significant statistical evidence for the effects of
uncertainty on the duration of international agreements: "[a]ll else equal,

45.

Id.at 771-73.

46. Id.at 773. The other two aspects, discussed in the literature as independent variables, are
enforcement problems and number of actors (number of actors refers to all entities that have an interest in
the issue, whether or not they are taking part in the negotiations or are a party to the agreement). Koremenos
et al., supra note 27, at 773.
47.
Gilligan challenges the common belief that there is a "broader v. deeper" tradeoff inherent to
the negotiation of international multilateral agreements. Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper
Trade-offin InternationalMultilateralAgreements?, 58 (No. 3) INT'L ORG. 459,460 (2004). He proposes
a formal model where states can set policy at different levels, thereby relaxing the single policy assumption.
In these cases, broad membership can be found to promote even deeper cooperation. Id. at 462.
48.
This literature proposes three conjectures bearing on the flexibility aspect of international
agreements: 1)flexibility increases with uncertainty (uncertainty about the state of the world); 2) flexibility
increases with the severity of the distribution problem; 3) flexibility decreases with number. Koremenos et
al., supra note 27, at 793-94.
49.

Id.at 773.

50.

World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

51.

Koremenos et al., supranote 27, at 773.
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agreements with high levels of uncertainty are about 44.0%
more likely to be
52
finite than are agreements with low levels of uncertainty.
With respect to an arms trade treaty, the flexibility story is not all good
news. In fact, another hypothesis that is confirmed by Koremenos research
deals with the number of participants. As the number of participants increases,
renegotiation costs also increase and, as a consequence, the probability of a
finite agreement decreases. 3 Thus, in a hypothetical arms trade treaty the
incidence of uncertainty and of a large number of participants is pulling the
flexibility solution in two different directions.
Unfortunately, research on flexibility tools that take the form of escape
clauses is not abundant. Rosendorff and Milner provide a detailed analysis of
the role of escape clauses in multilateral trade agreements, such as the
GATT/WTO 4 Because trade liberalization benefits are usually excludable, not
all the rationale behind their formal model applies to the arms trade issue,
where the benefits associated with disarmament are generally non-excludable.
With that caveat in mind, a key feature of escape clauses is that they are
costly.5 The benefits from suspending the terms of an agreement during a time
period must be accompanied by a penalty which the "escaping" state agrees to
ex ante, so that in theory, "policymakers should attempt to design efficient
escape clauses; they should act so that the incentive to exercise relief is
balanced with the gains from cooperation."56 The authors suggest that escape
clauses may be especially beneficial to democracies, " given the distinct role
that domestic constituencies play in politics, while discounting the need for
flexibility arrangements of this kind in arms control agreements. With respect
to the latter, disarmament through the reduction of stockpiles (nuclear and nonnuclear) is said to be of limited interest to constituents outside of the
security/military circles. 8
In conclusion, our limited understanding of escape clauses suggests that
they may be useful as an incentive for democracies, who will encounter
obstacles in the idea of a legally binding treaty. Otherwise, it is unclear
whether escape clauses or limits on duration can effectively counter the
uncertainties specific to the arms trade issue. In the next section, I explain why
52. Barbara Koremenos, ContractingAroundInternationalUncertainty, 99 (No. 4) AM. POL. SC.
REv. 549, 558 (2005).
53.

Id.at 557 n.22.

54. See generally B. Peter Rosendorff& Helen Milner, The OptimalDesignofInternationalTrade
Institutions: Uncertainty andEscape, 55 (No. 4) INT'L ORG. 829 (2001).
55.

Id.at 847.

56.

Id.at 835.

57.

Id.at 843.

58.

Id.at 845.
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democracies are expected to resist a legally binding treaty in light of the
literature on legalization of world politics.
IV. THE UN REGISTER: FEATURES AND EXPECTATIONS

According to the discussion of legalization offered in the literature, the UN
Register resulted from a soft legal document, wherein the levels of obligation,
precision, and delegation are relatively low.59 With respect to the level of
obligation, states are encouraged to report on arms transfers but nevertheless
have the legal prerogative not to do so, given the common understanding that
General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding." The analysis of the
levels of precision and delegation presents a more mixed picture. In fact, the
language of Resolution 46/36 [L] clearly lists the seven categories of equipment
that states are requested to report to the UN Register despite critics' demands
for more precise definitions ofterms and more detailed descriptions of reported
weapons." Moreover, a definition of arms "exports and imports" is offered as
well as the start date and other arrangements pertaining to the logistics of the
UN Register.62 Pursuant to the reports submitted to the General Assembly by
the Group of Governmental Experts, further refinements on the categories of
weapons covered were offered. 63 Finally, regarding the level of delegation, the
very institutionalization of an arms register entails a measure of monitoring and
interpretation (implementation). Surely, the other two aspects of delegation,
namely enforcement and adjudication, are absent. As states move toward the
negotiation of an arms trade treaty, advances in the level of legalization will be
contingent upon the existence of adequate solutions for some of the problems
that prevented states from going beyond the UN Register regime in the first
place. It is important to decompose the document's legal structure in order to
enhance our understanding of states strategic positions toward the issue. To
that end, I next review some of the predictions of the literature in light of the
empirical record of the UN Register from 1992 to 2006.
A. Goldsmith and Posner,The Limits of InternationalLaw
Goldsmith and Posner analyze states' choices with respect to the legal
form that international commitments assume.' In their view, the characteristics
59.

Goldstein et al., supranote 27, at 394.

60.
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEPHEN R. RATNER & DAVID
ACTORS, PROCESS 187 (2d ed. 2006).

(2005).

WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,

61.

Wezeman, supra note 6, at 7-8.

62.

G.A. Res. 46/36[L], U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991), at 75-76.

63.

2003 Report, supra note 15, at 33; 2006 Report, supra note 15, at 26.

64.

See generally JACK L GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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of a particular issue, given states' interests and capabilities, determines whether
regulation will be governed by soft law or hard law, and whether states will
choose to negotiate treaties or to sponsor the development of a norm of
customary international law.65 In a nutshell, because negotiation is costly,
unless states have specific reasons to enter into treaties (in the form of hard or
soft law), they will choose to regulate behavior through customary international
law. What then is the rationale behind the negotiation of international commitments like the one called for under Resolution 46/36 [L]? For Goldsmith and
Posner, the logic involves two steps: first, states feel the need to coordinate
behavior, and second, they see value in creating compliance-enhancing
mechanisms.66
This two-step logic derives from Goldsmith and Posner's understanding
of state behavior as strategic and self-interested.67 For them, interactions among
states follow four identifiable patterns: coincidence of interest, coercion,
coordination, and cooperation.68 Of relevance to the UN Register are the last
two, wherein coordination can be equated to instances where states have a
common interest but still need to agree on the path toward that outcome.
Situations that involve cooperation are more complex, because they present
states with high benefits associated with cooperation but even higher profits
associated with defection, when other states remain cooperative. This is the
classic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Goldsmith and Posner go further to suggest
that situations involving repeated bilateral instances of cooperation can lead to
compliance,69 which is clearly not the case of the UN Register.
If on one hand the establishment of the UN Register resolves the coordination problem (step 1)-on the other hand, a legally binding document would not
counter the incentives to defect that are inherent to the arms trade issue (step
2)--because this is by definition a multilateral rather than a bilateral case. By
negotiating a hard law document, states would have increased the costs associated with defection for no reason.7" It appears that Goldsmith and Posner's
model would predict the establishment of the UN Register as we know it today.
Nevertheless, there are countless multilateral treaties that incorporate legally
binding commitments. It is the rationale behind these documents that will eventually shed some light on the prospects of a legally binding arms trade treaty.

65.

Id. at 3. The authors prefer the term "nonlegal agreements" when referring to soft law. Id. at

66.

Id. at 87.

67.

Id. at 225.

68.

Id.

81.

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 64, at 88.
70.
1assume that non-compliance with a legally binding document brings more damage to state
reputation than defection from soft law.
69.
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There are three aspects to (hard) multilateral treaties that deserve attention.
Firstly, once states agree on a set of treaty provisions, renegotiation is costly.
Especially when dealing with treaties that aim at universal membership, states
hesitate to re-open the document for fear that a Pandora Box may ensue.
Secondly, states may choose the hard law option in order to engage domestic
audience concerns more directly, through the ratification process. Finally,
states may choose the hard law venue as a mechanism to delay commitment,
because soft legal documents are a lot easier to negotiate. Regarding the latter,
as time passes, the status quo may become more receptive of a given state's
preferred propositions. As the negotiation toward a legally binding treaty is
launched, it is important to maximize the role of incentives that work to
promote harder legal commitments.
B. Andrew Moravcsik, The Originsof Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in PostwarEurope
One example relating to the origins of (hard) multilateral regimes is
discussed in Moravcsik, who analyzes the birth of the European human rights
framework to reveal the puzzling disinterest that long-standing European
democracies in the 1950s had in the creation of a strong legal instrument.7
Rather, it was the several newly established democracies who rallied behind the
idea of a treaty which would contemplate the right to individual petition and
empower ajudicial body to enact binding rulings." The solution to this puzzle
carries applications to the negotiation under analysis here, as I articulate next.
Moravcsik sets out to analyze states' support for the creation of a human
rights regime in Europe after World War U." His research seeks to identify
patterns of support/opposition among different regime types, given the
encroachments that international human rights law present for sovereign
nations.74 To that end, European countries are classified into three categories:
democracies, newly established democracies, and non-democracies (or unstable
democracies).7 5 Subsequently, their attitude toward a hard legal option-a
convention on human rights that included the right to individual petition and
compulsory jurisdiction-is analyzed.76 The results confirm Moravcsik's
hypothesis that newly established democracies were the main force to support
a harder document, whereas all European democracies at that time, with the
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exception of Belgium, opposed inclusion of the right to individual petition as
well as compulsory jurisdiction.77
From a theoretical standpoint, Moravcsik proposes that newly established
democracies have an incentive to "lock in" any gains from their recent
experience with democratization.78 For fully established democracies, this
concern is not prominent, whereas for non-democracies it runs counter to their
goals ofpolitical survival.7 9 Moravcsik suggests that this theoretical framework
and empirical findings may shed light on the dynamics of other international
regimes." Based on the discussion offered in the article, I extend the
framework to analyze the patterns of support associated with the UN Register
in an effort to derive lessons for an arms trade treaty.
This exercise requires some adaptation of Moravcsik's framework: if on
one hand, the European Convention on Human Rights turned out to be a hard
legal document, on the other hand the UN Register remains a soft law instrument. Therefore, the expectations with respect to the UN Register should be
reversed: democracies should lend greater support to the Register, while newly
established democracies will display relatively lower levels of engagement.
Consistent with Moravcsik's predictions, non-democracies (or unstable
democracies) will be the least involved.81 These expectations reflect states'
motivations regarding one of the main goals of the UN Register: to promote a
culture of transparency over the arms trade issue.
For democracies, fostering transparency does not entail an unnecessary
encroachment on their sovereignty, precisely because of the soft nature of the
obligation. There are strategic reasons that lead democracies to support the UN
Register: transparency may potentially reveal valuable information regarding
arms transfers to and from non-democracies. On the other hand, transparency
is a practice usually well known to democracies, given that domestic
constituents demand accountability as part of the democratic game. For newly
established democracies the story is slightly different, because there are no
"lock in" mechanisms to guarantee commitments to transparency in the long
77.
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Here the following disclaimer is in order: Moravcsik's research design focuses on the origins
of a particular regime-the European human rights regime. The UN Register can be interpreted as a regime
in itself, and to that end, the negotiation that led to Resolution 46/36[L] would be the subject of analysis. In
my view, the UN Register can also be understood as a step toward the formation of an arms trade regime,
whereby attitudes of states in relation to the UN Register (report or not report) work as a proxy to the
negotiation of this other-more encompassing -regime that seeks to regulate the international trade on
conventional arms. I proceed with the analysis under the assumption that Resolution 46/36[L] marks an
important step toward the goal of an arms trade treaty.
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haul; after all, this is a soft law agreement. In the absence of the benefits
associated with hard law commitments, newly established democracies only see
the costs that transparency involves-for example, the timely production and
dissemination of data on arms trade-in a context of growing domestic
demands for accountability. For non-democracies, the demand for transparency
in the arms trade is a losing proposition, because it may compromise their
strategies for political survival. These nations often attempt to maintain their
military might by keeping their actual arms capabilities secret.
The data present a number of non-democracies that have submitted reports
several times. I consider those false positives, that is, countries that actually
report for reasons other than transparency. For example, Russia, the Ukraine,
and China are among the top twenty arms exporters.8 2 The first two have
reported every year since 1992, whereas China has reported six times between
1992 and 2006.83 I argue that pressure from the marketplace and the understanding that the choice to report may actually be a good business strategy,
motivate these countries to comply with Resolution 46/36 [L]. A similar
explanation may account for the behavior of some non-democracies that fall
within the top twenty arms importers category. Cases such as Pakistan and
Turkey, both having reported every year since 1992, s4 can be explained by the
fact that the two countries have increasingly been under the influence of the
U.S. and the EU, respectively.
A closer look at states' reporting behavior to the UN Register between
1992 and 2006 confirms the expectations laid out above. Table 1 presents the
average score for the three categories of regime type. I calculate the scores by
counting the number of reports that states submitted during the period analyzed,
so that a score of fifteen means that a particular state reported every year,
whereas a score of zero means that no report was submitted during the same
time period. In order to categorize countries according to regime type I rely on
Freedom House's Freedom in the World classification, which proposes three
aggregate measures: "free," "partly free," and "not free." 5 Countries that are
consistently coded as "free" by Freedom House between 1972 and 2006 make
up the group of established democracies. 6 Countries that are consistently
82.
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coded as "partly free" by Freedom House represent the newly established
democracies.8 7 Countries that are "not free" correspond to the non-democracies
(or unstable democracies).88

Table 1-Average Number of Reports to the UN Register (1992-2006)89

Number of countries

Average number of reports;
Reporting scores

Democracies
36
12.8
Newly established
47
9.9
democracies
Non-democracies
106
5.7
Top twenty arms
18
13.7
exporters*
Top twenty arms
20
8.7
importers**
* The majority ofthe top twenty (18) exporters consist ofdemocracies. There are two newly
established democracies (Brazil and Poland) and four non-democracies (Russia, Ukraine,
China, and North Korea).
** The majority of the top twenty importers consist of non-democracies. There are two
newly established democracies (India and South Korea) and six democracies (Israel, Spain,
the U.K., Australia, Greece, and Japan).

The results are consistent with the predictions in the literature. Newly
established democracies report less often than democracies. In fact, their
reporting score is twenty-three percent lower than that of democracies. Also
consistent with the literature, non-democracies report significantly less often
than both democracies and newly established democracies. The overall score
of non-democracies is probably inflated by false positives, such as the cases
discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is important to note that countries that
qualify as major arms exporters and importers, on average, report more often
than their counterparts in the same regime type category. This is of special
relevance for the top twenty arms importers, which consist primarily of nondemocracies. Their propensity to report is substantially higher when compared
87.
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to that of non-democracies that are not major arms importers (a score of 8.7 as
opposed to 5.7).
The balance of the UN Register is not as grim as many suggest. It has
managed to gather support among democracies as well as newly established
democracies. It has also attracted several non-democracies, even if for
unanticipated motivations. The world is slightly more transparent with respect
to transfers of conventional arms today than it was in 1991. More importantly,
states are more welcoming of a norm of transparency and accountability in that
area than they have ever been before. As we move towards an arms trade
treaty, what recommendations can we make based on this analysis?
1. Leverage support among democracies
Negotiators should be attentive to democracies and their preferences in
regards to an arms trade treaty. The literature predicts that the move toward a
harder legal regime will ignite skepticism among democracies, given their
resistance to the idea of encroachments on their sovereignty. So far, the United
States position with respect to an arms trade treaty confirms that preoccupation. 90 Here, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities,"
which has guided several environmental protection negotiations since the 1994
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9' may offer a template for creative
solutions that would address these countries' resistance to what they perceive
as an unnecessary trespassing of the boundaries of state sovereignty. To that
end, while the U.S. was a strong force behind Resolution 46/36 [L], it remains
skeptical of the notion of an arms trade treaty, as reflected in the voting record
of General Assembly Resolution 61/89 of 6 December 2006.92
2. Create selective incentives for non-democracies
Because non-democracies feature prominently in most instances of armed
conflict and human rights violations in the world, they are a natural concern for
the debate on arms trade. Aside from that, non-democracies clearly outnumber
democracies and newly established democracies in the world today. This
aggravates the collective action problem that permeates any attempt to control
the international trade in conventional weapons. Indeed, it is common wisdom
90.
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST COMMrrEE: MEETING #21, RECORDED VOTE:
TOWARDS AN ARMS TRADE TREATY, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/61/L.55 (Oct. 26,2006), [hereinafter Recorded Vote],
availableat http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/politicall1com/1com06/votes/L.55vote.pdf(last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
91.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
92.
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in the academic literature that the opportunities for collective action dwindle as
the number of actors increases.93 One of the proposed solutions to address the
provision of public goods by large groups lies with the institutionalization of
selective incentives. In other words, if the large contingent of non-democracies
can be offered perks in exchange for their participation in the arms regulation
effort, there is now an excludable benefit associated with cooperation.94 Aid,
technology transfer, and preferential trade status feature as good candidates.95
3. Alleviate cooperation costs for newly established democracies
as well as for non-democracies
The literature predicts that newly established democracies will favor hard
legal commitments because these agreements enable states to "lock in" any
gains from the democratization process.96 Nevertheless, compliance still entails
costs, and in the context of an arms trade regime, reporting costs are prominent.
In fact, transparency measures affect newly established democracies and nondemocracies alike, because these states are newcomers to accountability and
participatory practices that are deeply rooted among democracies. One way to
counter these disincentives associated with an arms trade treaty is to make
institutional assistance available to member states.
Beyond these recommendations, some general guidance can be extracted
from the theoretical analysis offered in the previous sections. In particular,
delegation and flexibility appear to have a prominent contribution to the treaty.
In the next section I expand the discussion on delegation and flexibility in order
to arrive at more specific propositions.
V. THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATY
Establishment of a dedicated bureaucracy to which powers to monitor,
interpret, and implement an arms trade treaty would be delegated will be key
to an effective agreement. This group of individuals can improve on the
accomplishments of the UN Register without the requirements of periodical
consensus reviews by a Group of Governmental Experts. Moreover, a
dedicated bureaucracy can devise selective incentives and mobilize domestic
constituencies as a means to promote compliance. With respect to selective
93.
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incentives, this bureaucracy could explore excludable benefits to an arms trade
treaty. For example, preferential trade status could be subordinated to membership and fulfillment of treaty obligations by the recipient state. Whereas this
strategy relies primarily on coercion, there is also a role for persuasion through
the mobilization of political elites and domestic constituents.9 7
There are several other reasons for emphasizing delegation. In particular,
newly established democracies will be more attracted to the treaty if it
contemplates "locking in" mechanisms. After all, this is the main motivation
for joining among this category of states. Alongside, a dedicated bureaucracy
might be better equipped to tackle connected problems, such as the diversion
of licit transfers. 98
The gains from delegation are not perceived equally by states. In fact,
democracies (as opposed to newly established democracies) are more resistant
to encroachments upon their sovereignty. Here, flexibility ofcommitments may
help to reconcile states interests, thereby facilitating universal membership. I
foresee a role for two forms of flexibility: time limits and escape clauses. As
explained before, scholars have found a negative correlation between the
number of participants and the imposition of limits on agreement duration. 99 As
the number of participants approaches universality, we tend to observe less, if
any, limits on agreement duration, due to the presence of renegotiation costs.
A possible compromise would establish relatively long limits on duration, much
like the institutional features of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.1 0
Finally, escape clauses will appeal to democracies as well as non-democracies. The latter may temporarily withdraw from treaty obligations when
facing a national security crisis. Interestingly, because escape clauses are
costly, "escaping" from the treaty may expedite the resolution of crises that
would otherwise linger in time. Democracies may see escape clauses as a
suitable counterweight to agreement rigidity, especially when there is resistance
by organized interest groups domestically. For example, the armament industry
is likely to be more accepting of an arms trade treaty that allows for temporary
withdrawal. It is important to keep in mind that organized interest groups
perceive costs and benefits associated with regulation in a concentrated manner,
as opposed to less organized groups within society, such as voters and
97.
The distinction between coercion and persuasion is made by Hafher-Burton in the context of
enforcement of human rights obligations. She reminds us that coercion and persuasion are not mutually
exclusive. Hafner-Burton, supra note 94, at 599-600.
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policymakers. Therefore, resistance from organized interests is much more
effective at influencing governments.' °'
It will be challenging to create escape clauses that balance costs and
benefits adequately. Escape clauses must impose a burden so as to deter
unwarranted withdrawal; but if these clauses are excessively costly, their
function as guarantors of agreement survival will be at stake. With respect to
an arms trade treaty, engineering escape clauses is no easy task. I leave further
thinking on this issue for future research.
Overall, recourse to delegation and flexibility mechanisms will contribute
to a strong and universal treaty. It will be helpful to assess what role these
mechanisms have played in similar treaties. For now, the scholarship on
legalization and regime design call attention to these two features of
international agreements as prominent aspects for successful negotiation and
enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper I discussed the prospects of an arms trade treaty in light of
predictions from the literature on legalization and regime design. The role of
delegation and flexibility emerged prominently in the analysis, which offers
specific justifications for various forms of flexibility as well as the functions of
a dedicated bureaucracy. The paper took a closer look at the reporting record
of states between 1992 and 2006 in order to assess theoretical expectations with
respect to regime type. Confirming the predictions of the literature, states
reveal reporting patterns associated with the degree to which they have
developed into fully established democracies. This exercise promotes a better
understanding of the distinct challenges each identified category will present
during the negotiation of an arms trade treaty.
Several analyses of the arms trade issue were discussed, including the two
most recent reports by the Group of Governmental Experts. 112 From that
overview, a mixed picture emerges: observers, from academia and think tanks,
do not match the optimism displayed by the GGE. The two extreme positions
seem to agree, however, on the need to address the issue of small arms and light
weapons. So far, the GGE has made progress in the debate but no strong
reform proposal was able to reach consensus among participants. As the
negotiation ofan arms trade treaty progresses, these unresolved issues are likely
to resurface. To that end, the Small Arms Survey 200703 continues to raise
101. James Q. Wilson, The PoliticsofRegulation, in THEPOLITICSOFREGULATION 357,358 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
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awareness to the implications of the trade in these weapons for human rights
and humanitarian law obligations.
Finally, areas that are ripe for further research were identified. More work
on the notion of flexibility is needed. Given the universe of multilateral treaties
that exists today, it is important to draw lessons in an attempt to engineer
optimum design mechanisms. Especially for treaties that aim at universal
membership, escape clauses, limits on agreement duration, and/or the admissibility of different policy levels may offer the key to self-enforcing institutional
arrangements.
In 1919, twenty three states signed the Convention for the Control of the
Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which never entered into force because states
failed to ratify the document."0 4 This treaty incorporated several design
elements: limits on duration (seven year renegotiation rounds), majority rule
for decisions on renegotiation, the creation of a dedicated bureaucracy (the
Central International Office), and provisions for arbitration of differences.0 5
The challenges we face in the new millennium are greater in many aspects. It
is imperative to find the right institutional recipe this time.
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